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Investor reactions to company disclosure of CEO to median employee compensation ratio: 
An experimental investigation* 
ABSTRACT 
Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which is yet to be implemented by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), requires that public companies disclose the CEO to median 
employee compensation ratio (hereafter, pay ratio). We conduct an experiment with Singapore 
MBA students to examine how such pay ratio disclosures influence the judgments of non-
professional investors. Participants evaluate a hypothetical company given either no pay ratio 
information (i.e., only CEO compensation as per current SEC regulations) or pay ratio 
information (i.e., CEO compensation, median employee compensation, and pay ratio, as per 
Section 953(b)). The company’s pay ratio, when provided, is higher than that of a comparative 
group of companies in the same industry. We also manipulate whether the higher-than-industry 
pay ratio is due to a lower-than-industry median employee compensation or a higher-than-
industry CEO compensation. We find that the higher-than-industry pay ratio reduces perceptions 
of employee morale, rank-and-file staff attraction and retention, and board effectiveness more 
when the higher-than-industry pay ratio is due to a lower-than-industry median employee 
compensation than when it is due to a higher-than-industry CEO compensation. The higher-than-
industry pay ratio also reduces perception about the fairness of CEO pay. However, the higher-
than-industry pay ratio has no effect on investment potential judgments. Our results are useful to 
regulators and companies who are contemplating the effects of pay ratio disclosures. 
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